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Rocking on its Hinges? The League of Nations, the United Nations and the New History of 
Internationalism in the Twentieth Century. 
Simon Jackson, University of Birmingham 
Alanna O’Malley, Leiden University 
 
I 
When the last remaining servants of the League of Nations (LON), led by Sean Lester, its final 
Secretary General, arrived at the San Francisco conference in the summer of 1945, belatedly 
invited by the United States government, they were “given no role and only seats in the last row 
of the gallery”. Amidst “much evocation of new orders and new worlds”, the main players at the 
conference scrupulously made “as little mention as possible of the organization that had gone 
before”.1 This act of diplomatic theatre symbolized a wider rupture with the past, ensuring that 
the nascent United Nations (UN) would not be tarnished by association with its purportedly 
‘failed’ predecessor. San Francisco, gleaming on the Pacific, was separated by a wide continent 
and another ocean from war-ravaged Europe, and particularly from the LON’s cavernous, empty 
headquarters in Geneva: the founding of the UN was meant to be a hinge, pivoting the world into 
a new era full of promise.2  
In certain respects it was - and it did. Differences between the LON and the UN were 
pronounced from the outset. The UN, and especially its General Assembly, was fundamentally 
more representative of peoples and nations than had been the ‘League of Empires’, to employ 
Susan Pedersen’s apt term, and it grew far more so as decolonization, in complex partnership 
with the Cold War, swelled the ranks of the main parliamentary organ.3 The UN also differed in 
its lack of certain powers that the LON had enjoyed, most noticeably as a result of the 
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introduction of the veto-system in the Security Council. But despite these major changes the UN 
also quietly assimilated – often in ways artfully hidden from the global public’s view - many of 
the LON’s organizations and experts, building on their work in a range of ‘technical’ (though 
still eminently political) areas, from healthcare to social and economic development policies, 
through, for example, the reformed World Health Organization and the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).4 
Historians have long chronicled the UN’s rise from the ashes of World War II, yielding a 
spectrum of conclusions from the laudatory and teleological to the critical and disaggregating.5 
Across the spectrum, however, many of them have shared a view of the LON as a salutary 
failure, the indispensable political counterpoint and analytical premise of the UN’s rise, and a 
failure habitually sketched in a brisk opening panorama peopled with Klemens Von Metternich, 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Woodrow Wilson, Aristide Briand and Adolf Hitler, before the author 
turns to a portrait of the post-1945 dawn.6 Karl Polanyi set an early example of this approach 
when he wrote that “In vain did Geneva look toward the restoration of such a [balance of power] 
system in an enlarged and improved Concert of Europe called the League of Nations; in vain 
were facilities for consultation and joint action provided in the Covenant of the League, for the 
essential precondition of independent power units was now lacking”.7 Only in the last decade 
have scholars gone back to the LON, asking not why it failed – and by implication why the UN 
‘succeeded’, or might yet succeed - but how the League worked, and what legacies its 
machinery, its personnel, and its global audience inspired. 8  
This book advances through the breaches in older historiography engineered by those scholars, 
as the contributors draw on the new literature’s insights to explore, through a global approach, 
the overlap between the LON and UN. They do so across the approximate period from the 1920s 
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to the 1970s, the long moment of the rise of the nation-state as a dominant political form 
worldwide, while also dropping periodically back into the late nineteenth century, in order to 
appraise the legacies of the first age of globalization.9 This is a chronology chosen advisedly and 
it has significant implications. Ranging from the “Wilsonian Moment” after World War I to the 
conjuncture of the Helsinki Accords and the twin rise of human rights and neo-liberalism in the 
1970s, the chapters tack back and forth across the ‘Year Zero’ of 1945, nuancing the naturalized 
binaries historians have balanced on that broad-shouldered year: empire versus the nation-state, 
(anti)-Fascism versus the Cold War, racial-civilizational hierarchy versus developmental-
economic hierarchy, and group-based rights claims versus individual rights claims.10 By doing so 
we hope to contribute to a wider debate on the periodization of the twentieth century stimulated 
by the growth of global histories of empire as a political formation, which often end in 1945. We 
also challenge other chronological patterns, such as Charles S. Maier’s influential analysis of the 
two post war moments of 1918 and 1945 in terms of embedded liberalism, a paradigm still 
influential in international history and international relations (IR).11  
Indeed, in the neighboring discipline of IR we hope more generally to enrich and refigure the 
ways in which constructivist, post-structuralist, critical and historically minded IR scholars 
conceive of international institutions, by providing a bridge to the new international history, one 
supported by a solid span of case studies. We hope thereby to foster a more sustained and 
mutually beneficial exchange between the fields. IR scholars of varied theoretical allegiance, 
from Robert Cox, Martha Finnemore, John Ikenberry, and Thomas Weiss, have long analyzed 
the ways in which institutions contribute to the construction of international norms and global 
orders, while debate on the nature of international organizations has regularly divided such noted 
structural realists as John J. Mearsheimer from such broadly liberal internationalists as Anne-
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Marie Slaughter.12 Exponents of more global approaches to IR, meanwhile, have increasingly 
deployed historical approaches to focus on bloc politics, smaller states and civil society actors, 
and, as in the case of Amitav Acharya for example, have emphasized the importance of non-
Western theories and regional specificities.13 The essays below will nourish such approaches, 
helping to expand and historicize views of the LON and the UN and the ways they shaped the 
international order. In doing so they bring into focus not just how institutions changed but also 
how international practices relating to the end of empire, nation-building in the postcolonial 
world and the creation of rights regimes evolved. As part of this process, many of the chapters 
draw out specific visions of how institutions worked as negotiated platforms, forums for debate 
and in some cases, agents themselves. Nathan Kurz’s incisive study of petitioning, for example, 
offers a new interpretation of the international legal system at mid-century ‘from below’ by 
positioning the LON and UN athwart locally specific yet internationally resonant strands of 
political reason. 
We thereby invite constructivist IR scholars towards still more granular historicizing of how 
institutions work and how they effected and continue to effect change in both state policies and 
broader cultures of the ‘international’. Far from setting the varying schools of thought against 
each other, we encourage engagement with critical and positivist IR theory alike in deliberating 
on the dynamic role that these organizations have played in shaping internationalisms across 
time. It is argued in many of the chapters below that internationalism was far more than the 
product of what global institutions like the UN or LON did centrally, or how they funneled or 
shaped the sovereign power of empires and nation-states. Rather, internationalism in this volume 
includes regional cooperation, non-state activism, the rise of international civil society and the 
global dialogue between local actors and the international visions of the elites. As the case 
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studies show, all this sustained an array of different types and forms of internationalism, and thus 
offers plentiful resources to IR scholars who have long moved past static categories of analysis 
such as ‘development’ and ‘modernity’. In undercutting the telos of such logics, the book opens 
up, in George Lawson’s terms, different “context[s] and narrative[s]” of internationalism, but it 
also sharpens and refreshes modes of enquiry based on the social scientific staples of 
“eventfulness and ideal-typification”.14 
 
Across the watershed of 1945 then, the chapters examine the interconnected evolution of 
internationalist ideas, institutions and practices between the LON and UN, encompassing 
empirical fields from political strategy to economic development, from international law to 
practices of rights, and from humanitarianism to the changing forms of empire. Changes in 
internationalist thought and technocracy are thereby placed into dialogue with practices that 
connected Geneva with many parts of the world, such as the re-constitution of political identity 
in the Middle East or the imperial use of forced labor. As a whole, we show how the LON and 
UN both shaped and were shaped by global internationalism, in the rich variety of its 
protagonists and the grinding tectonics of its norms.15 
Crucially, the book takes this approach not just from the habitual ‘centers’ of League and UN 
politics, the fetishized lieux de mémoire of Geneva, New York or Bretton Woods, where the 
clacking of secretariat typewriters echoed against the carved wheat sheaves of prosperity 
foretold, but from a global perspective.16 We do not neglect the importance of the politicians and 
diplomats who strode the stage in the Palais des Nations or at the UN Headquarters in 
Manhattan, or ignore the administrative and technocratic bureaucracies that operated the scenery 
and drafted the scripts.17 But our central argument is that although the LON and UN shaped 
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internationalism from the center, as political proscenia, technocratic clearing houses and vehicles 
for world ordering, they were just as powerfully molded by internationalisms that welled up 
globally, far beyond the main stages of Geneva and New York City.18 As such, the history of 
internationalism at the LON and UN must be grasped as much in Japan and Argentina, for 
example, as in Geneva and Manhattan. Indeed, as historians including Meredith Terretta and José 
Antonio Sánchez Román argue, the prisons of West Africa or the banks of the Amazon and 
Tigris were places just as ‘international’, and quite as constitutive of ‘internationalism’, as the 
smoke-filled committee rooms and champagne-oiled assemblies overlooking Lac Leman or the 
East River.19  
To give an example, Nova Robinson’s chapter in this book, on international women’s rights from 
1920-1953, opens at a typical League event – a pre-Assembly reception in Geneva that included 
a keynote by Maria Vérone, a leading French advocate of women’s rights, and that likely also 
featured the popping of champagne corks, the massed “artillery of the League of Nations”.20 But 
crucially, Robinson also weaves into her account the campaigns of the General Oriental Feminist 
Alliance, a regional Arab women’s organization based in Syria, and appraises the January 1931 
gathering, in Lahore, of the All Asian Women’s Conference. By bringing the delegates at Lahore 
into analytical conversation with the delegates who saw Vérone at her Swiss podium, Robinson 
is able to show how the internationalist “spirit of Geneva” was partly made in the Punjab. In 
doing so she also warns international historians against reproducing, in the balance of their 
research, those hierarchies and exclusions that structured the cast and made the stars of the 
cacophonous, long-running performances in Geneva and New York City.21 Likewise, Konrad 
Lawson’s study of the visions for world federalism conjured in the ruins of defeat by Japanese 
politician-writers Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko shows how the global re-ordering that 
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took place after 1945 must be grasped not just at San Francisco or Bretton Woods, but also in 
how the discussions and disappointments of those epochal meetings opened up national and 
regional spaces, in which the tortured transformation of older ideas unfolded for use in a new, 
postwar society.  
As the geographical and archival diversity of these examples suggests, the strength of a 
collective volume lies in its ability to “allow various specialists to enter into a broader dialogue 
while addressing specific, common themes”.22 Methodologically, meanwhile, the scope of a 
collective analysis allows for a blend of the insights of de-centered ethnography, lately 
exemplified by Lori Allen’s recent work on human rights practices in Palestine, with wide-
angled views on the spatially expansive cultures of internationalism, as in the work of Anne-
Isabelle Richard, Helen McCarthy and Glenda Sluga on the associative infrastructure of the 
League, and finally with political studies of the dynamics in play on the central stages of Geneva 
and Manhattan.23  
As a whole, the chapters that follow construct a multi-scalar, dialogical, and fine-grained 
historical analysis of the role of international organizations as they shaped and were shaped by 
political internationalism across the twentieth century. Together they present an exceptionally 
wide, though far from complete, ensemble of actors, across social hierarchies and racialized 
geographies, and show how the interactions of those actors tested the limits of the LON and UN 
as international institutions, and developed internationalism as a variegated practice around the 
world. 
For international historians and students of international relations the consequences of this 
argument are significant, since they mandate a critical re-engagement with area studies, global 
history and social history, and with a variety of sources far beyond the holdings of the 
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international organizations themselves. For if the appeal of the LON and UN archives has 
consisted in their apparent convocation of the world’s opinions and petitions under one roof, and 
perhaps in their translation of that polyglot clamor into English and French, the idea that the 
overlapping internationalism of the two organizations welled up at the margins quite as much as 
it was made at the center challenges the epistemological hegemony of those documents.24 As 
Terretta has aptly noted of the new wave of human rights histories - in a manner applicable to the 
wider historiography on internationalism and international institutions - they have generally 
excluded “the narrative accounts of grassroots activists in favor of official state documents, UN 
resolutions, or the letters, speeches, and writings of elected office-holders, UN representatives, 
and colonial administrators … But how far can we go in examining human rights and 
decolonization in the Afro-Asian bloc without contextualizing the particular settings in which 
human rights discourses were invoked?”25 Meeting this challenge will require international 
historians to travel further, learn more languages, and above all collaborate more systematically 
in order to capture the meanings and practices of internationalism at the LON and the UN.26 This 
volume takes a step in that direction. 
 
II 
Efforts to institutionalize the management of the world order have a history as old as the exercise 
of imperial power, and the narrower process of institutionalization has frequently been 
accompanied by the attempts of legislators, national states and varyingly mediated global publics 
to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and 
cultural force field.27 From the Magna Carta to the Diet of Worms, and from the Hague 
Conventions on International Law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the geopolitical 
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clearing houses built at the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, collective strategies to create and 
govern a system of international relations, and to develop legally binding agreements in order to 
realize a specific vision of world order, have underpinned they system that we now refer to as 
global governance.28 In the litany of institutions that have shaped international relations and their 
interpenetrated norms and cultures, however, the LON and the UN are distinguished, as Sluga 
has lately noted, by their emergence within global wars of unprecedented scale and 
destructiveness.29 The League slowly took shape in the years around 1920, following the defeat 
of the Central Powers in World War I, while the United Nations came into being, as we saw 
above, during the post-World War II moment around 1945, an extension of the alliance that had 
defeated the Axis Powers. But while both institutions were forged during wartime, each 
developed distinct visions for how to manage peacetime relations, facilitate social progress and 
resolve international security dilemmas, due in part to the wider context and deeper roots of their 
respective eras. Nathan Kurz’s contribution to this volume, for example, on Jewish NGOs in the 
late 1940s, shows how numerous protagonists at the UN, many of whom had worked for or in 
contact with the LON, set out to create, interpret, and disseminate various accounts of the League 
so as to justify specific policies after 1945. We must therefore acknowledge both of the 
institutions as distinct regimes of global governance, specific centers of their respective 
internationalist force fields, the character of which is open to exegetical interpretation by 
historians. But we must also see the LON and UN as a single, interpenetrated, and temporally 
layered whole, whose empirical global history is indispensable to that work of exegesis, and is 
only now being written.30 
 
Based on the famous ‘Fourteen Points’ outlined in January 1918 by the American President 
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Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations came into being as an instrument with which to 
manage international security crises, and crucially, to keep the power of Germany and other 
aggressor states in check following World War I. Wilson presented his ‘Fourteen Points’ as a 
series of edicts about how the imperial world system would be reformed, and how relations 
between states would henceforth be managed; its often vague premises were elaborated, 
mitigated and reworked at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Covenant of the League was 
its governing charter and statement of purpose, and was drawn up by Wilson and his advisors in 
contentious collaboration with the victorious allied powers, dominated by Great Britain and 
France. It was an effort to realize many of the Wilsonian principles, setting out policies supposed 
to prevent another world war. The Covenant therefore proposed a series of security measures, 
including disarmament and the use of arbitration to settle international disputes. It also contained 
a list of treaties on a variety of related technical and social issues, from drug and human 
trafficking to global health initiatives and labor conditions, and two geopolitical management 
systems that acted to “adjudicate relations of sovereignty”: protection of minorities, mainly in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and administration of former subjects of the Central Powers in 
the Mandated territories, scattered through the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific.31  
The LON’s birth in the mirrored delivery room of Versailles meant that it was dominated by the 
victors: of its fifty or so member states, Germany joined only in 1926 and left again seven years 
later, the USA never joined at all, and the Soviet Union joined only in 1934. Despite this, the 
League was never simply a tool of Britain and France. Having survived being abandoned by the 
USA, it became an ungovernable theatre for international publicity and norm making in the 
1920s, and increasingly a factory of influential technocratic knowledge production in the 1930s - 
as in the case of the economic and financial activities lately documented by Patricia Clavin.32 
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Overall, as Susan Pedersen has convincingly argued, what was most important about the League 
was its role as a public platform, managed by an international bureaucracy of technicians and 
experts, on which individuals, international organizations, and nations-in-the-making could air 
their views and petitions, and find an audience.  
Turning to the UN, as preparations began in earnest for a new international organization even 
before World War II concluded, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen – as 
noted above – to avoid any association with the tarnished image of the LON. The United Nations 
was received in San Francisco with fanfare from the war-weary international public, and was 
greeted especially enthusiastically in the Global South, where it appeared as a means to unravel 
the imperial system. From its inception therefore, the new organization did not just protect the 
interests of the Western powers, but again became an important platform and a mechanism 
through which the international visions of other actors were amplified and heard. Advocates for 
decolonization, civil rights activists and a range of other groups objecting to imperial practices, 
such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led by 
American sociologist and activist W.E.B Du Bois, seized upon the organization as a means by 
which to pursue his agenda for civil rights. The San Francisco planners’ announcement of a new 
era of universal ideals was music to the ears of the beleaguered societies still living under 
imperial or mandated rule, to the nationalist aspirations of their future leaders under the colonial 
yoke, but also to the nascent anti-colonial movement which would radically impact the UN in the 
1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the truly representative structure of the new organization 
was lauded as a platform for discourses about rights, the universalizing of human rights and the 
deconstruction of the racialist, traditional, liberal international order. 
As the organization developed through the 1950s and 1960s it was particularly shaped by the 
 11 
visions and ambitions of anti-colonial actors who sought to implement and realize the principles 
enshrined in the Charter by creating, through the UN, mechanisms, tools and policies designed to 
end empire and imperialism through formal means. The success of the decolonization process 
managed and supervised by the UN can thus be partly attributed to the role of newly-independent 
states lobbying in the chambers of the Security Council and the General Assembly for a shift in 
norms of imperial politics, and to their invigoration of the potential of the Charter.33 At the same 
time during these years, the visionary Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld adopted an 
interventionist approach to international politics, empowering his office with the support of the 
anti-colonial lobby and driving the anti-colonial agenda forward.34 In the process, he helped to 
activate the agency of the UN, positioning it as a peacekeeping organization, a neutral arbiter 
between states and as a monitor of peace settlements from the Suez Canal in 1956 to the Partial 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.  
Building on these achievements, through the 1970s and the 1980s the UN developed as much 
more than a “Parliament of Man” paralyzed by Cold War politics. From asserting the rights of 
states to control their natural resources, to efforts to reshape the international economic order, 
through to the development of a myriad of human rights and the expansion of forms and 
expressions of developmental practice through the 1970s and the 1980s, internationalism became 
increasingly variegated and diversified - and yet more visible than ever.35 The end of the Cold 
War and the resurgence of interest in the UN as a means of managing international conflicts led 
to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. Out of these 
experiences, both positive and negative, emerged the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 
which continues to define how the international community approaches questions of 
intervention, protection of citizens and conflict resolution. The UN remains at the center of a 
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wide array of debates on how to manage international relations, development, humanitarianism, 
social and economic equality, environmental problems and international security dilemmas 
among other areas of global governance.  
 
In sum, both the League and the United Nations operated not as unified actors, but rather as 
‘platforms’ for both formalizing and splintering political ideas and international norms, and as 
laboratories and toolkits of legal and technical procedures, which as Natasha Wheatley has lately 
shown in the case of Palestinian petitioners to the LON, could then be used to generate new 
spectrums of negotiation and dissidence with which to return to the fray on the ‘platforms’ of 
Geneva and New York.36  
 
III 
How did the LON and the UN effect change - and in relation to which forms of global 
internationalism - during the shift from a world of empires to one of nation-states?  
In the first section below, both institutions are viewed as a platform for interaction between 
states, and as an arena in which international norms were reified and reconstituted through the 
increasingly representative constituency in the varied LON and UN bodies and the global 
networks with which those bodies connected. In this way, both institutions served to collate and 
codify nascent normative practices, for instance around various rights claims, into recognized 
international norms, or in some cases into international law. This is particularly evident in these 
chapters, which examine the evolution of ideas and principles such as human rights, as discussed 
by Andrew Arsan, and economic sovereignty, as discussed by José Antonio Sánchez Román, 
Mats Ingulstad and Lucas Lixinski. Arsan contextualizes the role of Charles Malik, in numerous 
 13 
accounts as a figure of the UN ‘center’ par excellence, which carve him out alongside the likes 
of René Cassin as a founding father of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.37 
While acknowledging Malik’s role in the committees of the early UN, Arsan shows how his 
allegiance to Heideggerian thought and his long steeping in the traditions of Lebanese national 
particularism means we must see neither Malik, nor the ideas of human rights he helped 
elaborate, as examples of ‘conventional’ post-1945 internationalism, even to the degree 
postulated in the revisionist accounts, such as Samuel Moyn’s, that have lately downplayed the 
salience of human rights in the 1940s.38 Instead, Arsan argues we must recognize the 
irreconcilably tangled multiplicity that informed Malik’s critique of the sovereign nation state as 
the basis of internationalism, and thereby come to terms with the powerful global and interwar 
influences on the elaboration of the UN human rights regime.  
José Antonio Sánchez Román, meanwhile, focusing on ideas of economic sovereignty, outlines 
the emergence, well before the fabled era of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1940s, of a “new, unevenly and intermittently unified global 
periphery”, including Brazil, Romania and Iran, in the LON’s technical economic meetings of 
the 1920s.39 By focusing on the politics of fluvial trade, shipping, and the international taxation 
of imperial big business in the 1920s, Román shows how practices of economic sovereignty 
crystallized in Geneva, Brussels and Barcelona in part through the creation of new connections 
between, for example, Brazil, Iran and British Mandate Iraq on river navigation, or between 
Argentina and South Africa on monetary policy.40 Drawing on several Argentinean and Brazilian 
archives, and marrying business history with global intellectual history to remarkable effect, 
Román also shows how Latin American jurists, such as the Venezuelan Federico Álvarez Feo, 
fought against the recycling at the League of nineteenth century imperial legal practices of 
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extraterritoriality, and against influential business lobbies’ use of a liberal economic vulgate to 
camouflage monopoly power. As Feo proclaimed, arguing that the LON committee for double 
taxation should investigate foreign utility companies gouging citizens of Latin American states: 
“the law of supply and demand does not work in many South American countries.” Feo’s 
assertion, Román demonstrates, was an early instance of the wider Latin American attempt to 
refuse the concept of ‘backwardness’ between roughly 1920 and 1980, and to work through the 
LON and UN to reshape economic sovereignty accordingly.  
The illumination provided by a ‘de-centered’ Latin American perspective on the international 
order recurs in Mats Ingulstad’s and Lucas Lixinski’s chapter on Pan-Americanism at the LON 
and UN. They show how the international politics of empire and decolonization, as they emerged 
in Geneva and subsequently in New York, were powerfully affected not just by the European 
empires’ self-preservation instincts, as influentially described by Mark Mazower, but by forms of 
regional and hemispheric internationalism with roots in the nineteenth century. Latin-American 
states’ experience with the Monroe Doctrine, which underpinned the hegemony of the United 
States in the Western Hemisphere, informed their approach to both the LON Covenant and the 
UN Charter: Article 51 and Chapter VIII (on regional arrangements) of the latter were 
particularly influenced by Latin American perspectives.41 As Jesús-María Yepes, the Colombian 
jurist and successively a delegate to the LON Assembly, the wartime Pan-American conferences 
and the 1945 San Francisco conference put it: “the Republics of the New World, whose spirit of 
international collaboration is well known, did not want to abandon a regional system that was 
well organized and had proved its mettle, in favor of another, universalist system whose 
efficiency had not yet been proven ... the Charter of the United Nations therefore implies no 
derogation to the Pan-American system”42 Consequently, on issues such as dispute arbitration 
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and non-intervention, Latin Americans toggled ceaselessly, generally by means of international 
law and lawyers, between the successive regional and global scales of internationalism on offer, 
in the pursuit of a more resilient mode of national sovereignty.  
By tracing the evolution of these concepts of human rights, economic and national sovereignty 
therefore, the first three chapters characterize the League and the UN as networked political 
forges, where ideas were catalyzed, modified and legitimized.  
 
In the second section, three chapters show how the secretariats of the LON and UN worked in 
combination with a proliferating batch of sub-agencies and a closely orbiting set of philanthropic 
foundations and non-governmental associations to develop expertise in a range of different fields 
of global governance. Here too, the simultaneously distinct and interlinked character of the LON 
and UN comes to the fore. Nathan Kurz’s chapter on individual petitioning at the LON and UN 
shows how the two petition regimes’ legal vocabulary, and the procedures devised as part of the 
respective processes, made it possible for individuals to test the legitimacy of the international 
order and spur grassroots activism. Shifting between the interwar politics of the 1933 Bernheim 
Petition to the LON, made in defense of Central European minority rights threatened by Nazism, 
and the later activities of Jewish NGOs lobbying the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Kurz 
dissects the complex interrelationship between the two institutions, which cannot be as easily 
decoupled as some recent literature has suggested.43 Drawing on innovative sources including 
television talk shows, and concentrating on the practical and social legal politics of rights rather 
than simply on the intellectual politics of abstract categories in the thought of major theorists, he 
shows how petitioning allowed local experience to be crafted into international knowledge, and 
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how post-1945 Jewish activists reconstructed the Bernheim Petition in the service of their goal to 
universalize minority rights.  
Florian Hannig’s chapter takes up another sphere of activity at the other end of our chronological 
range, as he shows how the UN’s permanent and expansive role in the system of humanitarian 
aid expertise had its origins in UN planners’ interpretation of the LON’s record, but fully 
crystallized only in the 1970s. De-centering the history of international humanitarianism, Hannig 
positions the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971 as the moment at which the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) definitively came to the fore, coordinating some ten 
million refugees through a hugely expanded budget and also contributing to the establishment of 
the United Nations Disaster Relief Fund and the development of the World Food Programme 
(WFP). Hannig identifies three broad phases that led to this moment. First came the years from 
1943-1951, when deliberately temporary UN expedients, responding to the LON’s perceived 
track record, sought to alleviate post-World War Two suffering, largely in Europe. Second was 
the period 1949-1970, the era of the high Cold War and of national sovereignty-focused 
decolonization, when ad-hoc agencies with a limited mandate responded to specific crises such 
as the Agadir earthquake of 1960 in Morocco, or the displacement occasioned by the close of the 
Algerian War of Independence in 1962, while the permanent UN agencies concentrated on 
economic development. Finally, Hannig analyzes the period since 1971, as the UN created a 
durable, global humanitarian relief regime. His chapter illuminates how the 1930s and 1970s 
were both decades of growing technocracy at the LON and UN respectively, and also how both 
decades saw waves of new geopolitical multipolarity that pushed states, including the USA, to 
re-envisage their relationship to international organizations. Against this backdrop Hannig 
emphasizes how in the post-Biafra climate of public opinion, and thanks to contingencies 
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including Pakistan’s exclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
UNHCR stepped into the breach in 1971, part of the wider rise of human rights politics in that 
decade.44 
Finally, Nova Robinson’s chapter on the Liaison Committee of International Women’s 
Organizations (LCIWO) and the Origins of an International Women’s Convention similarly 
explores the role of the LON and UN in developing expertise, this time in the service of 
women’s rights, and again shows how the two institutions also helped to produce exclusions 
even within campaigns for legal equality. As representative to the LON and UN for a long list of 
national women’s rights organizations, the LCIWO created a repertoire of publicity tactics and 
juridical arguments in seeking to make the international sphere deliver formal legal equality for 
women around the world, as the culmination of decades of struggle. Based on expert studies, and 
pushing to expand the often male-dominated definition of legitimate expertise, activists felt an 
international treaty could then be used to pressure recalcitrant national governments to enforce 
rules on equality between the sexes in a range of areas. But the largely North Atlantic and middle 
class membership of the LCIWO – the same women who have generally been the subject of 
scholarship on this question to date - substantially excluded the concerns and demands of women 
in the colonial world.45 Far from accepting this marginalization, such women organized and 
fought to make their own claims heard and to place their own representatives, such as the 
Ottoman and then Lebanese women’s activist Nour Hamada (1897-1963), at the heart of the 
debate. As Robinson shows in her path breaking work, the women of the colonized world must 
be brought fully into this history, not least because the patterns of exclusion and inclusion 
established at their expense at the LON would strongly influence precisely who participated in 
the post-1945 international debate on women’s rights at the UN, right through to the 1970s.   
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Overall, this section shows how the members of the adjunct agencies and central secretariats of 
each institution, in dialogue with a wide range of non-governmental groups and social 
movements welling up around the world, helped to bring key issues to the attention of 
international society. More than that, it shows how numerous internationalist actors worked to 
make the LON and UN sites for the production of expertise that would bring about change, and 
thereby produced policies that continue to have important legacies for international approaches 
to such questions today. 
 
In its third section, the book takes a wide-angled view of how the LON and the UN acted in 
different ways as crucibles for change in world order, and shows how shifts in the balance of 
international relations related to changing forms of internationalism.46 To do so the chapters 
deploy local and imperial frames of analysis to identify crucial wider contexts and establish the 
ways in which the LON and UN were shaped or disaggregated by those contexts.  
Sarah Shields’ study of what she calls ‘consociational politics’ starts from two local cases: the 
Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta/Iskenderun, in the north of French Mandate Syria, and the 
earlier case of the city of Mosul, in British Mandate Iraq. Through a close analysis of the way the 
LON mediated the Turkish-French dispute over Alexandretta in 1936 and the Turkish-British 
conflict over Mosul in 1925, Shields shows how the Wilsonian logic of sovereignty, based on 
popular consent, led to an essentialist - and essentializing - quest to categorize individuals as part 
of religious ‘communities’, whether majority or minority.47 Since the political balance of 
representation in Alexandretta and Mosul, and consequently the territorial fate of the two 
regions, was to be indexed to the size of each ‘community’, voter registration processes became 
an over-stoked furnace in which political identities and constitutional facts were forged in a 
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frantic atmosphere of ultra-instrumentalized historical and sociological claim-making. Shields 
shows how despite the fact that individual LON missions to Mosul returned with much changed 
assumptions about the possibility of even allocating ‘communal identity’, let alone basing 
political preferences on it, governments in Ankara, Damascus and Beirut all bought into the 
notion that the identity of the governed would determine their politics, and used the premise to 
build irredentist campaigns at the LON. Shields then expands her argument into the UN era, 
examining the subsequent trajectory of consociationalism as a paradigm in post-1945 political 
science and assessing the ways in which the UN staged the distillation and distribution of this 
paradigm into the constitutional arrangements of newly independent and developing countries. 
She closes with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, and the body blow 
dealt to the Iraqi nation state in the aftermath by the American imposition of a consociational set 
of political arrangements based on hazy assumptions about the meaning of religious community.  
Konrad Lawson’s chapter takes up another context of global re-ordering against a backdrop of 
US military offensive, this time in East Asia at the time of the UN’s birth. Lawson recovers the 
surge of creative transnational idealism that characterized the 1940s – the “apogee of 
internationalism” according to Sluga – and the calls for various forms of world federalism 
prompted both by the experience of World War II and the introduction of atomic weaponry and 
also by interwar ideas for regional and world organization in Japan, which reached a climax with 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere announced in 1940.48 Lawson delivers a close 
reading of the way two key figures in Japanese politics - Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko – 
responded to the context of defeat and the potential of global internationalism in its aftermath. As 
Lawson notes, across issues from language and education reform to the applicability of the 
historical pattern of Japanese national integration to the creation of a world government, as 
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“founding president of the League for the Establishment of a World Federation (Sekai renpō 
kensetsu dōmei, predecessor to the World Federation movement in Japan today) and a leading 
representative of an embattled strain of prewar liberal politics, Ozaki Yukio provided the 
Japanese world federalist movement with a grandfather-like leader”. Simultaneously, the more 
famous Kagawa Toyohiko, a Christian evangelist, cooperativist and social activist, despite his 
equivocal wartime support for the Japanese expansion into Asia, pivoted in 1945 to describe the 
San Francisco conference of that year as merely the first step in the creation of a genuine ‘world 
state’ (sekai kokka).  By showing how both thinkers drew on decades of intellectual and political 
experimentation in Japan to critique the LON and UN as merely the first step to a fuller world 
federation, Lawson portrays how the two institutions acted as a catalyst for dynamics far from 
Geneva and New York City: catalysts that also had powerful pre-war, regional and national 
roots.  
Finally, in a chapter spanning the years 1919-1962, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro 
Monteiro cap the book by appraising the impact of the LON and UN on another imperial 
formation, the Portuguese Empire in Africa, and specifically on the politics of forced labor. 
Forced labor was an elemental aspect of the politics of colonial social hierarchy in colonies such 
as Angola and Mozambique, and also indispensable to the century-long series of projects to 
revivify Portuguese Empire through the creation of ‘new Brazils in Africa’. In a trio of case 
studies – after World War I and World War II and finally in 1957-1962, closing with the 
abolition of the dual labor regime – the authors explore ways in which engagement with the LON 
and UN, and with transnational modes of publicity and NGOs, forced the Portuguese Empire to 
rethink and internally scrutinize its policies on forced labor, even as it became an imperial and 
metropolitan political outlier in the UN era, when newly independent countries such as Ghana 
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quickly became key antagonists for Lisbon at the UN by using the legal tools furnished by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). 
 
Ultimately this book offers a multifaceted and global perspective on internationalism, explicitly 
connecting the LON and UN while simultaneously outlining their differences, and emphasizing 
the influence of movements and powers that welled up around the world, far from Geneva and 
New York yet in dialogue with those main stages. In doing so it reveals the inescapable 
complexity and diversity of internationalisms, from the visions of Charles Malik to the 
revolutionary visions of Nour, Hamada and from the Portuguese colonial administration 
wrestling with the Ghanaian government at the ILO to the efforts of Latin American states to 
bring their influence to bear on the international order. Striking a balance between national 
policies, institutional standards and practices of internationalism, each of the chapters tracks its 
question and actors across a range of levels of interaction. We hope that by outlining a more 
global approach to twentieth century internationalism – encompassing forces that welled up in 
South and East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe as well as the 
North Atlantic West – and by treating its two central institutions as a conjoined entity, we will 
encourage further research along these lines. Such research will mingle international institutional 
perspectives with a serious engagement with local histories, national views and regional ideas 
about world order, based on archives and secondary historiographies in a wider variety of 
languages. By showing how the League and the UN were shaped by movements welling up from 
the outside, the two institutions emerge as networked platforms, effective instruments and 
sometimes agents through which the contested nature of internationalism, in a variety of shapes 
and sizes, evolved across the twentieth century. 
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